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Preface
Foreign affairs have always involved a degree of secrecy. The EU external action 
is no exception. Out of security concerns and to protect the confidentiality of 
international negotiations, EU foreign policy actors such as the Council and the 
European External Action Service manage access to information by classifying 
EU documents as ‘secret’. 
How can such classification be reconciled with the EU principles that “decisions 
are taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen”? In this 
timely report, Professors Deirdre Curtin and Christina Eckes critically examine 
how this balance is determined, and the role other EU institutions, including the 
Courts, play on this terrain. 
This study is the seventh report SIEPS publishes in the context of its research 
project The EU external action and the Treaty of Lisbon. 
 
Eva Sjögren
Director
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Executive summary
Foreign affairs have always, to some extent, been conducted in secret. This has 
occurred both in the national and in the European Union contexts. Apart from 
the fact that secrecy is justified with reference to a specific subject-matter, such 
as security, there is an additional rationale for secrecy in foreign affairs: the 
involvement of external actors pursuing their own agendas. Such consideration 
highlights the importance of maintaining confidentiality in relation to 
negotiation strategies, internal agreements and potential secondary motives. 
In particular, in the context of national as well as EU foreign affairs, the 
executive enjoys a wide discretion in the way it manages preservation of secrecy 
and the level of openness. Such management becomes visible not only from 
the perspective of external actors, but also the general public. The secrecy in 
foreign affairs thereby is in strong contrast with the EU’s fundamental principle 
of openness. Not only must ‘every citizen’ have ‘the right to participate in the 
democratic life of the Union’ but also ‘decisions’ require to be ‘taken as openly 
as possible and as closely as possible to the citizen’ (Article 10(3) TEU). More 
importantly, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 established a standard for right of 
access to all EU documents, including such documents that relate to common 
foreign and security policy. 
In order to manage the need for secrecy in foreign affairs within the framework 
of the EU Access Regulation, the EU and its agencies in the realm of foreign and 
security policies such as the European External Action Service (EEAS), Frontex, 
and Europol are required to balance the overarching demands of transparency 
with the needs of executive secrecy in certain contexts, especially with regard 
to national security and international relations. Hence, in the EU’s external 
relations, executive autonomy has manifested itself in the development of several 
instruments that serve to classify information as confidential thereby limiting 
public access.
This report focuses on managing access to information declared confidential by 
the institutions, organs or bodies of the EU. It zooms in on three topical and 
illustrative examples of how the EU’s approach to classified information creates 
pockets of official secrets in EU foreign affairs. The three illustrative examples 
that have been chosen for the purpose of this exploratory report are secrecy as 
manifested in the rules governing the constitution of the EEAS, the adoption of 
EU autonomous sanctions against ‘blacklisted’ individuals based on information 
classified by the Member States, and the secrecy surrounding the negotiation 
of international agreements on a variety of substantive (security-related) issues.
The EEAS strives to enable the exchange of valuable and sensitive information 
between its diverse staff while protecting its diplomatic and intelligence services. 
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Nevertheless, it developed security rules in 2013, which are almost identical to 
those of the Council and the Commission in terms of classification of and access 
to documents. In contrast with the EEAS, the EU and its member states are not 
constrained by external actors but rather choose to keep secret the information 
upon which EU sanctions are based. The composite procedure requires 
the mutual sharing of ‘relevant information’ between competent domestic 
authorities in member states and the Council as well as the permanent CP 931 
Working Party, which is responsible for preparing the list of terror suspects. 
Unfortunately, many details of the adoption procedures for autonomous EU 
sanctions remain ambiguous. This is due to several elements: the broad level 
of discretion enjoyed by the Council in monitoring the procedure; the use of 
classified and confidential information as the basis of listing; and, the difficulties 
related to the use of confidential information in judicial proceedings before the 
EU courts.1 
International agreements pose another challenge as their adoption increasingly 
depends on the approval, or at least the absence, of a veto by the European 
Parliament. This arises by virtue of Article 281(10) TFEU which states that the 
European Parliament is to be ‘immediately and fully informed at all stages of 
the (negotiating) procedure’. This entitlement includes the Parliament’s right to 
access sensitive, or even, confidential documents. Finally, the privileged access of 
the Parliament has been repeatedly challenged before EU courts, for instance, by 
MEP Sophie In‘t Veld, who based her case also upon rights derived from the EU 
Access Regulation. 
Judicial review remains the most effective mechanism for restricting unlimited 
secrecy in the conduct of EU foreign affairs. However, such a mechanism can 
be effective only where a case is actually brought before the courts. Only in 
these circumstances will the question of the balance between secrecy provisions 
and constitutional articles on openness and democracy be brought into play. 
It remains to be seen how the courts (and in particular the CJEU on appeal) 
will attempt to balance the originating provisions of the Treaty as amended by 
the Lisbon Treaty and the ongoing practices (and perhaps diplomatic habits) 
of EU institutions across a range of policy areas. It is clear that the courts, in 
reviewing secondary legislation for compatibility with the Treaty, do more than 
simply interpret the law; they fill gaps, clarify ambiguities, and decide which 
of the warring parties should win2. The rulings of the courts have important 
implications, not only for the individual litigants, but also for the structure and 
organisation of the EU institutions themselves. In conclusion, it is clear that the 
EU executive is not entirely ‘unbound’ in the area of external relations; however, 
clarity is required in relation to the nature of the existing controls and on how 
effective they are in constraining unconstitutional conduct.
1 EU courts refers to the CJEU and the General Court.
2 J. Heliskoski and P. Leino (2006) ‘Darkness at the Break of Noon: the Case Law on Regulation 
1049/2001 on Access to Documents’ 43 Common Market Law Review 735-781.
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1 Introduction
The concept of state secrecy connotes the idea of an object, a process, or a person 
rendered invisible to outsiders. Outside parties are often unaware that secrets 
exist; ‘they are in the dark about the fact that they are being kept in the dark’.3 
Secret keeping is important. It endows secrets with value. This value is based, not 
on the content of the secrets, but rather on the fact that others are excluded from 
knowing about such secrets. The act of secrecy ‘gives the person enshrouded by it 
an exceptional position’.4 Control over secrecy and openness thus gives power; it 
influences what others know and thus what they choose to do. Yet secrets are not 
merely invisible to outsiders, but may also be invisible to insiders or categories of 
insiders.5 Secrets may be deep but they can also be shallow (or become shallow). 
Shallow secrets are knowable by outsiders, in particular by oversight institutions 
that may be in a privileged position to pursue information. The media may also 
be privy to such secrets.6
National security is widely accepted as the prime justification for employing 
criminal sanctions to protect official government information. It is a vague 
concept that goes to the fundamentals of government and concerns the 
security of a state and the safety of its people. Intelligence gathering and the 
role of intelligence agencies are also seen as a crucial part of national security. 
In national democracies, the executive enjoys a considerable monopoly over 
‘national security’ secrets and the checks and balances that exist in this area are 
not as robust as in other areas.7 This weakness in controls also exists in foreign 
or external relations, including the negotiation of international treaties. The 
argument is periodically made that in security and foreign policy matters, the 
executive is ‘unbound’ in the sense that it is not (and should not be) subject 
to democratic checks and balances, in particular, when it acts in the interests 
of (national) security.8 However, it can also be shown that checks and balances 
of various types have in fact emerged in response to this unrestrained executive 
3 D. Pozen (2010) ‘Deep Secrecy’ 62 Stanford Law Review 257–339, at 260.
4 G. Simmel (1906) ‘The Sociology of Secrecy and of Secret Societies’ 11 American Journal of 
Sociology 441–98, at 464; L. Van Boven et al. (2013) ‘Do You Wanna Know a Secret?’ New York 
Times, 28 June.
5 Pozen, note 2 supra, 269-70.
6 K. L. Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law (University of Chicago 
Press, 1988).
7 See, for example, S. Schulhofer (2010) ‘Secrecy and Democracy: Who Controls Information 
in the National Security State?’ available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1661964> (last visited 7 February 2016).
8 This executive supremacy claim is prominent in much of the ‘national security’ literature in 
the United States. For one of the most forceful recent expressions of the view, see E. A. Posner 
and A. Vermeule, Terror in the Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts, (Oxford University 
Press, 2007). See too, E. A. Posner and A. Vermeule, Executive Unbound. After the Madisonian 
Republic, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, 2011).
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autonomy.9 These countervailing checks and balances over executive power 
include most prominently the ‘right to information’ of certain actors, both 
privileged (parliaments and courts as oversight forums) and non-privileged (the 
public and affected individuals, albeit within certain limits). 
The Treaty of Lisbon explicitly embraces the vision of the role of the citizen as 
part of an overall system of representative democracy applied in the multi-level 
context of the European Union. One of the foundational values of the Union 
is the principle of openness.10 Openness strengthens representative democracy 
by enabling citizens to uncover the considerations underpinning legislative and 
administrative action in a legal and political context where there is no full political 
accountability whether at the European or at the national level. Openness can 
also have a further catalysing function of sparking public debate outside of 
the administration, leading to opinion formation with substantive outcomes 
that cannot be foreseen/controlled by executive institutions or actors. Article 
11 TEU in addition embraces, in a novel fashion, a more participatory 
understanding of democracy ‘beyond representation’.11 Not only must ‘every 
citizen’ have ‘the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union’ but 
also ‘decisions’ must ‘be taken as openly as possible and as closely as possible 
to the citizen’ (Article 10(3) TEU). In addition, certain obligations regarding 
openness, transparency and participation are placed on ‘the institutions’ 
(Article 11(1) to (3) TEU), exemplifying their ‘democratic inspiration’.12 
One of the most significant ways of building secrecy for governments and executive 
actors more generally is by internal systems of classification of documents.13 This 
approach involves officially classifying information and sharing such classified 
information with other states and institutions at various governance levels. 
The rules on the classification of sensitive information at EU level – developed 
incrementally over time – constitute an understudied subject both in terms of 
the legal framework and the empirical practice. Despite the Commission’s initial 
leading role with regard to security management of information following the 
Maastricht Treaty, it is the Council that has played a leading role in this regard 
in recent years due initially to its new competences (and those of the Member 
States) in the areas of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and 
Defence. In 2011, and later, the Council autonomously expanded what is now 
9 See, J. Goldsmith, Power and Constraint. The Accountable Presidency after 9/11, 1st ed. (Norton, 
2012).
10 Art. 1 TEU. See further, D. Curtin and J. Mendes (2011) ‘Transparence et participation: des 
principes démocratiques pour l’administration de l’Union Européenne’ 137-138 Revue Francaise 
d’Administration Publique 101-121.
11 A. von Bogdandy (2012) ‘The European Lesson for International Democracy: The Significance 
of Articles 9 to 12 EU Treaty for International Organizations’ 23 European Journal of 
International Law 315-334.
12 See, Curtin and Mendes, note 8 supra.
13 See further D. Curtin (2013) ‘Official Secrets and the Negotiation of International Agreements: 
Is the EU Executive Unbound?’ 50 Common Market Law Review 423-458.
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known as the European Union Classified Information (EUCI) to cover any of 
the interests of the EU or of the Member States. The legal basis for the Council’s 
security rules is primarily its own Rules of Procedure. These security rules also 
involve the application of rules – equivalent to those adopted by the Council 
– to a wide variety of other EU institutions and agencies. In this regard, the 
Council’s explicit aim of introducing a comprehensive system of EUCI for the 
EU as a whole has largely been achieved.
The broad rationale for classification is that secrecy – at a certain level – is 
necessary to carry out a specific substantive executive policy and covers both ‘deep’ 
and ‘shallow’ secrets.14 Unnecessary secrecy is part of a broader phenomenon 
of formally unclassified information – controlled but unclassified information 
(hereafter CUI) – that is nonetheless deemed secret by the government or the 
institution that guards it and is thus not released to the public but shared instead 
with other executive actors at various governance levels.15 The underlying rationale 
for secrecy is generally process-based whereby the decision-making process as 
such is prioritised – for example, the need to keep strategic information secret 
while negotiating. 
This report focuses on managing access to information declared confidential 
by the institutions, organs or bodies of the EU. It zooms in on three topical 
and illustrative examples of how the EU’s approach to classified information 
creates pockets of official secrets in EU foreign affairs. It makes no claim to be an 
exhaustive treatment of secrecy in the external relations of the EU more generally 
but selects three, arguably salient, examples within this broader field that throw 
up difficult questions of achieving balance between the general requirements 
of transparency and the specific needs or wishes of executives to maintain 
discretion and manage information in a non-public way. The three illustrative 
examples that have been chosen for the purposes of this exploratory report are 
secrecy as manifested in the rules governing the constitution of the EEAS, the 
adoption of EU autonomous sanctions against ‘blacklisted’ individuals based 
on information classified by Member States, and the secrecy surrounding the 
negotiation of international agreements on a variety of substantive (security-
related) issues. Each of the examples selected exposes different aspects of secrecy 
in foreign policy matters; at the same time, they exemplify the challenges posed 
by the EU constitutional order which requires a balancing of the overarching 
demand for transparency with the needs of executive secrecy in certain contexts, 
especially with regard to national security and international relations.
Our report is sub-divided into five parts. Section one introduces the rationale for 
secrecy in foreign relations and expounds the principles that govern classification 
14 See, Pozen, note 2 supra. 
15 See further on the different rationales for secrecy and their relationship with the exceptions to 
the principle of access to documents as interpreted in recent years by the Luxembourg courts:  
D. Curtin (2012) ‘Judging EU Secrecy’ 2 Cahiers de Droit Européen 459-490. 
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of information within the EU, such as the principle of originator control. It 
further addresses the particularity of the EU’s CFSP. Section two examines 
secrecy within the EEAS – a highly relevant subject in the context of a European 
diplomatic corps. Section three focuses on a highly salient example of secrecy 
within CFSP, namely, restrictive measures adopted by the EU. It considers, in 
particular, the situation where the EU and its Member States have full control 
over the information on the basis of which restrictive measures are adopted. 
This is exemplified by the adoption of EU autonomous sanctions in reliance 
on information that is classified by the Member States. Section four widens 
the focus beyond the CFSP; it turns to secrecy with respect to the conclusion 
of international agreements both in the area of CFSP and other policy areas. 
Section five looks at certain checks and balances in the context of the adoption of 
international agreements, particularly in the European Parliament, and further 
examines decisions of the Court of Justice which have bolstered these safeguards. 
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2 Secrecy as managing 
access to information in 
public hands16 
The discussion of secrecy in this paper focuses on managing access to information 
possessed by a public authority, i.e. institutions, organs or bodies of the EU. An 
important exercise of official power is deciding the rules on access to sensitive 
information and on the length of time for which such information can be 
retained. In the context of the EU and of democratic systems more generally, 
there is an inevitable tension between the requirement of transparency or 
openness and the ‘need’ to keep certain public matters secret. 
Transparency has been a crucial aspect of the efforts of the EU to address 
concerns regarding its democratic legitimacy or lack thereof. Article 1 of the 
Treaty on the European Union refers to a vision of the Union in which ‘decisions 
are taken as openly as possible’. The European Commission in its 2001 White 
Paper on European Governance also highlighted that transparency is a key 
principle of good governance.17 More importantly, the year of 2001 marked an 
important stepping-stone for transparency by the adoption of the legal binding 
instrument, Regulation 1049/2001, known as the EU Access Regulation.18 
This Regulation provided for direct access by EU citizens and residents to 
Community documents enabling them to gain insight into and contribute to 
EU decision-making.19 However, the EU’s efforts to pursue openness through 
public access to information have been accompanied by vigorous efforts by 
executive institutions, especially the Council, to establish a fully-fledged practice 
of secrecy, specifically through rules of classified information. In the view of the 
Council, the establishment of EU rules on official secrets is necessary for the 
purpose of EU security policies and cooperation.
Traditionally, national security, the conduct of international relation, and 
the preservation of law and order, were considered as belonging to those 
areas necessitating high levels of secrecy. Gradually other less cogent reasons 
were given for maintaining high levels of secrecy. For example, the need for 
16 This part draws on Curtin, note 11 supra, and D. Curtin (2014) ‘Overseeing Secrets in the EU: 
A Democratic Perspective’ 52 Journal of Common Market Studies 684-700.
17 European Commission, European Governance: A White Paper, COM (2001) 428 final, OJ 
(2001) C 287/1, 25 July 2001, Section II.
18 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 of the European Parliament and of the Council regarding 
public access to documents, OJ (2001) L 145/43.
19 A.J. Meijer, D. Curtin and M. Hillebrandt (2012) ‘Open Government: Connecting Vision and 
Voice’ 78 International Review of Administrative Sciences 10.
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discretion in conducting certain internal processes of government in the interests 
of effective policies was cited as such a reason. There is no European Union 
equivalent of a ‘national security’ interest or power. Article 4(2) TEU is quite 
categorical that ‘national security’ is a competence reserved to Member States. 
The EU does not have its own intelligence agencies or security agencies with 
their own formal powers of interception and surveillance, yet some of its existing 
agencies (EEAS, Frontex, Europol) clearly perform security and intelligence-
related tasks. Additionally, as a ‘crisis’ manager, in a manner that is now part 
of its mainstream business, the EU clearly exercises a range of classic tasks of 
international relations and external affairs. In addition, it has acquired new tasks 
in sensitive policy fields such as external security, internal security, economic 
and monetary governance, and banking supervision. Moreover, the diffuse 
and fragmented EU executive power interacts with other actors at different 
governance levels, for example, with regard to internal and external EU security, 
foreign policy and external relations, diverse EU institutions and agencies, third 
States, international organisations (such as NATO and the UN) and Member 
States (through their intelligence agencies and otherwise). 
Security measures and negotiations do not automatically grant a carte blanche 
justification to EU executive institutions for nondisclosure of documents. A 
mere invocation of security concerns by executive institutions is not sufficient 
for the Court of Justice to accept restrictions on public access to documents. The 
Access Regulation explicitly foresees that the right of public access should apply 
to documents relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy and to police 
and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.20 Nevertheless, Article 4(1)(a) of 
the Regulation provides exceptions to public access to documents in the context 
of international relations and security of a ‘mandatory’ nature. On the basis 
of the wording of Article 4, distinctions are drawn between ‘mandatory’ and 
‘non-mandatory’ exceptions.21 The mandatory exception provision under Article 
4(1a) implies that once the relevant circumstances to invoke the exception are 
established, the institution in question is not required to balance the protected 
20 Regulation (EC) 1049/2001, note 17 supra, preamble, para 7. 
21 Art. 4 of Regulation (EC) 1049/2001 reads: 
(1)  The institutions shall refuse access to a document where disclosure would undermine the 
protection of: 
  (a)  The public interest as regards: Public security; Defence and military matters; 
International relations; The financial, monetary or economic policy of the Community of 
the Member States. 
  (b)  Privacy and the integrity of the individual, in particular in accordance with Community 
legislation regarding the protection of personal data. 
 (2)  The institutions shall refuse access to documents where disclosure would undermine 
the protection of: Commercial interests of natural or legal person, including intellectual 
property; Courts proceedings and legal advice; The purpose of inspections, investigations, 
and audit; unless there is an overriding public interest in disclosure.
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interest against the general public interest in disclosure.22 This is in contrast to 
the exceptions under Article 4(2) regarding protection of commercial interests or 
inspections, which require that even if it is established that a protected interest 
falls under the exception, the institution is nevertheless still required to balance 
whether the general interest in disclosure outweighs the necessity for protection.
 
On issues of security, Article 9 of the Access Regulation is also relevant as it 
specifically refers to sensitive information that protects the ‘essential interests 
of the European Union or of one or more of its Member States in the areas…
[of ] public security, defence and military matters’. Article 9(3) of the Regulation 
provides that the originator of sensitive information may decide not to disclose 
the document or, alternatively, to give authorisation to include the document 
in the register. In the CJEU’s interpretation of Article 9(3), the originator of 
the document is justified in refusing not only the disclosure of the document’s 
content but also of its very existence.23 The identity of the originator of the 
document can in fact also remain undisclosed.24 Articles 4(1)(a) and 9(3) of the 
Regulation, according to their interpretation by the CJEU, provide space for 
the Council to exercise quite a measure of discretion as to whether a document, 
classified or unclassified, should be disclosed.
In many of the cases which have come before the European Court over the 
past decade, the Council, relying specifically on the exceptions in Article 
4 of the Access Regulation, has argued that the efficiency of its decision-
making procedure requires the non-disclosure of its documents.25 It defends 
an instrumental understanding of transparency for democratic purposes that 
requires that it be ‘balanced’ against the interests of efficiency and security. In 
addition, the Council defends the preservation of what it terms a ‘reasonable’ 
22 Case T-105/95 WWF UK v Commission [1997] ECR II-313, para. 58; Case T-20/99 Denkavit 
Nederland v Commission [2000] ECR II-3011, para. 39; Case C-266/05 P Sison v Council 
[2007] ECR I-1233, paras 46-48, 108; Joined Cases T-110/03, T-150/03 and T-405/03 Sison 
v Council, [2005] ECR II–1429, paras. 51-55, 107; Case T-264/04 WWF European Policy 
Programme v Council [2007] ECR II-911, para. 44; Case T-300/10 Internationaler Hilfsfonds v 
Commission [2012] ECR II-0000, para. 124; Case T-465/09 Jurašinović v Conseil [2012] ECR 
II-000, paras. 47-49.
23 Case C-266/05 P Sison v Council, note 21 supra, para. 101.
24 Ibid., para. 102.
25 See, for example, CaseT-376/03, Hendrickx v. Council, EU:T:2005:116; Joined Cases T-110, 
150 & 405/03, Sison I, Case T-371/03; Le Voci v. Council, EU:T:2005:290; Case C-266/05 
P Sison v Council, note 21 supra; Case T-264/04, WWF-EPP, ECLI:EU:T:2007:114; Joined 
Cases T3/00 & 337/04, Pitsiorlas v. Council and ECB, EU:T:2007:357; Joined Cases C-39 
& 52/05 P, Sweden and Turco, ECLI:EU:C:2008:374; Case T-233/09, Access Info Europe v. 
Council, EU:T:2011:105; Case T-529/09, In ‘tVeld v. Council, EU:T:2012:215; Case T-465/09, 
Jurašinovic´ v. Council, note 21 supra; Case T-63/10, Jurašinovic´ v. Council, EU:T:2012:516; 
Case C-280/11 P, AIE; Case T-331/11, Besselink; Case C-576/12 P, Jurašinovic´ v. Council, 
EU:C:2013:777; Case C-350/12 P, Council v. In ‘t Veld, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2039. 
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degree of confidentiality and autonomy to decide on the limits to secrecy.26 Yet, 
the Council often invokes broad and vague reasons by which it aims to justify 
non-disclosure of documents (see further, the In ‘t Veld case discussed below). 
26 See Vigjilenca Abazi and Maarten Hillebrandt (2015) ‘The Legal Limits to Confidential 
Negotiations: Recent Case Law Developments in Council Transparency: Access Info Europe and 
in ‘t Veld’ 52 Common Market Law Review 825, 825-846, at 838-840.
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3 Secrecy in foreign affairs
3.1 Rationale
Foreign affairs have always to some extent been conducted in secret. This is the 
case both in the national and in the European Union contexts. Apart from the fact 
that secrecy is justified with reference to specific subject-matter such as security, 
there is an additional rationale for secrecy in foreign affairs: the involvement of 
external actors pursuing their own interests. Such consideration highlights the 
importance of maintaining confidentiality in relation to negotiation strategies, 
internal agreements and potential secondary motives. In the EU context, this is 
confirmed by the Regulation on public access to documents (Access Regulation), 
which sets out international relations as a reason to refuse access.27 The necessity 
for secrecy in the context of international relations is also acknowledged by the 
EU Courts.28 At the same time, the EU does not have a general political question 
doctrine. Judicial review and the transparency that comes with it are not excluded 
simply because a subject matter falls within the EU’s external relations. 
3.2 EUCI, CUI, ORCON, and derivative classification29
To understand secrecy in EU external relations, one needs to understand the 
underlying system of classifying information. The EU protects confidential 
information through a classification system and accompanying rules on how 
to handle both EU classified information (EUCI) and information classified by 
Member States. With regard to both internal and external EU security, foreign 
policy and external relations, a multiplicity of entities officially classify information 
and share such classified information with one another: EU institutions and 
agencies, third States, international organisations (NATO and the UN) and the 
Member States (through their intelligence agencies and otherwise). Such entities 
also in one way or another restrict the circulation of what is sometimes referred 
to as ‘CUI’. This category includes professional secrets or personal information 
subject to data protection rules. The entanglement of rules relating to ‘official 
secrecy’ – with rules on openness and public access to documents is further 
complicated by the widespread application at all levels and by virtually all actors 
of the principle of originator control (hereafter: ORCON). Such principle refers 
to the practice by which the originator of official documents, both classified 
and unclassified, determines who gets access after it has been shared with other 
actors.
27 Exceptions in Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, note 17 supra.
28 See e.g. Case C-350/12 P, Council v In ‘t Veld, note 23 supra. EU courts refers to the CJEU and 
the General Court.
29 This part draws on Curtin, note 11 supra, and C. Eckes ‘Decision-Making in the Dark? – 
Autonomous EU Sanctions and National Classification’, in I. Cameron (ed.), Legal Aspects of EU 
Sanctions (Intersentia, 2013). 
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ORCON allows originating governments, agencies, or institutions to control 
the declassification of information (where it is classified) or the release of such 
information to non-governmental parties (where it is not classified). In March 
2011, the Council adopted its first decision on the security rules for protecting 
EU classified information,30 applying the ORCON rule to all EUCI.31 The 
current security rules on EUCI, which repealed and replaced the 2011 rules, 
were adopted in September 2013.32 They provide for the continued application 
of the ORCON principle to all EUCI.33 The Member States meeting within the 
Council (but not acting as the Council) further adopted, in 2011, an agreement 
on ‘the protection of classified information exchanged in the interests of the 
European Union’, in which the Member States agreed to apply the ORCON 
principle.34 The application of this principle precludes the ability of actors who 
process information belonging to others to make their own judgments on the 
wisdom of releasing such information. The requirement to consult the author 
(the originator) before granting public access to or declassifying the information 
is deeply embedded within the Council’s rules and has, furthermore, since 2001, 
also featured in several places in the access to documents legislation.35
Similarly ingrained in the EU’s classification rules is the principle of derivative 
classification. This principle stipulates that a person who, in classifying a 
new document, incorporates into it parts of an old classified document must 
generally classify the new document at the highest level revealed by the combined 
documents, irrespective of whether the information re-used actually justifies 
that. Both these practices can lead to over-classification, which results essentially 
in unnecessary classification or unnecessarily high classification, adding to an 
accumulated culture of secrecy within a bureaucracy.36
The main pitfalls of the system of information sharing of classified information 
in the EU context can be summarised in a number of points. First of all, 
information sharing and exchange can go as far only as Member States allow 
30 Council Decision of 31 March 2011 on the security rules for protecting EU classified 
information, OJ (2001) L 141/17.
31 See Article 3(2) on downgrading or declassifying of EUCI; see Article 12(4) on exchange of 
EUCI with third states or international organisations. Compare also Article 3(2) of Annex A, 
Principles and Standards for Protecting EUCI, attached to the High Representative’s Decision 
of 19 April 2013 on the security rules for the European External Action Service, OJ (2013) C 
190/1.
32 Council Decision of 23 September 2013 on the security rules for protecting EU classified 
information, OJ (2013) L 274/1.
33 E.g. ibid., Art 3(2).
34 Agreement between the Member States of the European Union, meeting within the Council, 
regarding the protection of classified information exchanged in the interests of the European 
Union, OJ (2011) C 202/5. See in particular Article 4.
35 See, Article 4(4) and Article 9(3) of Regulation No 1049/2001, note 17 supra.
36 The statistics made available at the EU level tend to be limited to those produced by the Council 
in its annual reports on access to its information. See most recently, Annual Report 2014 
available at <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/publications/2015/
council-annual-report-access-documents-2014/> (last visited 7 February 2016). 
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it to go. Institutions and agencies, as well as the EEAS, have limited powers 
to make Member States, as well as other actors, share either their information 
or their experience of difficulties in obtaining information.37 Secondly, in many 
cases, sensitive information cannot be shared among institutions or agencies. 
Member States or other actors, both national and international, remain 
‘owners’ of the information and it is only with the permission of the originator 
that this information can be shared. Classification and declassification are the 
monopoly of the respective institutions and bodies. Until very recently, there 
was no procedure – or practice – of declassification. In 2011, the Council issued 
guidelines38 on the issue and the first declassification decisions are now emerging. 
Information is shared among many sources (national and supranational; internal 
and external; private and public) and the information thus shared tends to be a 
commingling of both internal and external security aspects. Pertinent questions 
arising, such as the nature of the information being used and the manner in 
which it is being utilised, are not at all straightforward and may serve a variety of 
purposes, ranging from priority-setting and policy-making to actual operational 
implementation. There is a certain level of impairment in the operational 
function of information, caused by the fragmentary nature of the information 
being sourced. Ultimately, this makes it impossible to independently verify 
the reliability of such information. The problem is compounded at EU level, 
arising from the combination of the issue of security and the classification rules 
which are regulated purely at the level of the internal organisation of individual 
institutions.
The absence of independent checks or oversight of a growing body of ‘secret’ 
information is highly problematic at EU level, given the growing scope for 
secrecy and the likelihood of over-classification that necessarily flows from 
the use of secrecy and the principles of originator control and derivative 
classification.39 The fact that a specific inter-institutional agreement has now 
been negotiated between the European Parliament (EP) and the EEAS enables 
the EEAS to give the EP access to classified information and presumably to 
provide a measure of oversight in this regard. In effect, this is part of a wider 
strategy engaging the European Parliament as a security actor alongside other 
37 See also, House of Lords, European Union Committee, ‘Europol: Coordinating the Fight 
Against Serious and Organised Crime’, 29th Report of Session 2007-08, Report with Evidence, 
published 12 November 2008; M. Busuioc, D. Curtin and M. Groenleer (2011) ‘Agency 
Growth Between Autonomy and Accountability: the European Police Office as a ‘Living 
Institution’’ 18 Journal of European Public Policy 848-867; and M. Busuioc, M. Groenleer and 
J. Trondal (eds.), The Agency Phenomenon in the European Union: Emergence, Institutionalisation 
and Everyday Decision-making (Manchester University Press, 2012).
38 Guidelines on downgrading and declassifying Council documents, as approved by the Council 
Security Committee on 22 September 2011, available at: http://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/
document/ST-14845-2011-INIT/en/pdf (last visited 7 February 2016).
39 See also D. Curtin, ‘Top Secret Europe,’ inaugural lecture, University of Amsterdam, 2011, 
that attempts to launch a broader debate. available at <http://oratiereeks.nl/upload/pdf/PDF-
5066weboratie_Curtin.pdf> (last visited 7 February 2016).
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EU security actors,40 but it does reduce the ability of the EP to perform its public 
accountability function fully and publicly. It can however also be viewed as the 
first stage in a process of engagement by a wide variety of EU actors (including 
the European Central Bank and the EEAS and others) in sharing information 
with a supranational parliamentary organ (the European Parliament) thereby 
reinforcing the apparatus of checks and balances at supranational level.
3.3 How special is CFSP?41
The EU’s CFSP has developed over the past twenty-odd years since it was 
formally introduced by the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993. The creation of CFSP 
was motivated by a realisation that the existing institutions and procedures for 
political and military cooperation were inadequate for reaching a common 
European position on international issues. The goal was to set up a framework 
for allowing the Union ‘assert its identity on the international scene’42 without 
‘prejudice [to] the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain 
Member States’.43 It is hence aimed at ensuring a ‘position of the EU’ that 
can combine the political clout of the Member States. Referring to CFSP as a 
policy may be misleading; it covers a wide array of policies, ranging from civil 
and military missions aimed at preserving peace and strengthening security to 
diplomatic efforts to ensure international cooperation on issues such as nuclear 
proliferation and climate change. CFSP instruments (or policies) with the 
greatest legal bite are the EU’s sanctions policies (see below). 
CFSP is part of EU external relations but remains in many ways special. It is 
subject to special procedures, which limit the role of the Commission and the 
Parliament, and exclude, with limited exceptions, the Court’s jurisdiction. The 
Parliament is kept informed of its activities but does not have a formal decision-
making role. Formally, the Commission has only a limited role, e.g. it lacks a 
function as a watchdog of Member States’ compliance. Yet in its limited role, it 
is involved at all levels of decision-making. At the highest level, this involvement 
manifests itself by its engagement with the High Representative44 and, at another 
level, it extends to participation in the working groups and committees, including 
the EPC. The Council is consequently the main decision-making institution 
under the CFSP. This gives the Member States and their representatives a more 
dominant position than in other policy areas. Member States are also the main 
providers and processors of information.
 
40 See the view of D. Galloway (2014) ‘Classifying Secrets in the EU’ 52 Journal of Common 
Market Studies 668–683, at 679-81. See, however, Curtin, note 14 supra.
41 This part draws on C. Eckes, EU Counter-Terrorist Policies and Fundamental Rights: The Case 
of Individual Sanctions (Oxford University Press, 2009) and C. Eckes (2015) ‘The Common 
Foreign and Security Policy and other EU policies: A Difference in Nature?’ 20 European Foreign 
Affairs Review 535-552.
42 Ex-Article 2 TEU [Nice version].
43 Ex-Article 17(1) TEU [Nice version].
44 E.g. Article 30 TEU. 
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A game changer in this regard is the establishment of the EEAS, one of whose 
main tasks is to serve as a hub for policy coordination and information evaluation 
and sharing. The EEAS is – despite the fact that one-third of its staff is seconded 
from the Member States’ diplomatic service – a true EU body, receiving and 
processing information related to CFSP. The remaining two-thirds of the staff are 
EU officials from the Commission and from the Council’s General Secretariat. 
The EU applies its described classification system across the broad spectrum of 
all its activities with no special mention or position given to the CFSP. Yet CFSP 
is an area where considerations pertaining to the security of the Union and its 
Member States are particularly cogent. These considerations may justify the 
concealment of certain information or even of its very existence from the public. 
Indeed, the largest share of classified information relates to the EU’s CFSP. It 
concerns for example EU positions on and approaches to the political situations 
in third countries45 or specific aspects of the EU’s counter-terrorist strategies, 
such as necessary changes to the listing procedure.46 
45 E.g. concerning the Russo-Georgian war in 2008: a joint EU Special Representative/Secretariat/
Commission non-paper containing concrete proposals for an enhanced EU role in the conflict 
resolution efforts (coreu message CFSP/SEC/1433/08 – EU RESTRICTED); Georgia 
Monthly Bulletin of 7 July 2008 (EU CONFIDENTIAL), issued by the Situation Centre 
(SitCen); EU Watchlist of 16 July 2008 (EU CONFIDENTIAL), issued by the Intelligence 
Directorate (IntDir); Georgia Monthly Bulletin of 4 August 2008 (EU CONFIDENTIAL), 
issued by SitCen; demarche by the local Presidency in Moscow on 15 July 2008 at the Russian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (coreu message CFSP/PRES/PAR/0325/08 of 17 July 2008 – EU 
RESTRICTED); demarche by the local Presidency in Tbilissi on 17 July 2008 at the Georgian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (coreu message CFSP/PRES/PAR/0329/08 of 17 July 2008 – EU 
RESTRICTED). 
46 Fight against the Financing of Terrorism of 21 June 2007 (Council document 10826/07 – EU 
RESTRICTED).
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4 European External Action 
Service
The EEAS may be seen as the European Union’s diplomatic service. It helps 
the EU’s foreign affairs chief – the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy – carry out the Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
On 15 June 2011, the EEAS formally adopted its own security rules47, as 
explicitly envisaged by Article 10(1) of the EEAS Decision.48 The decision of the 
High Representative lays down rules for the safety and security of the EEAS and 
establishes the general regulatory framework for effectively managing the risks 
to staff, physical assets and information, and for fulfilling its duty of care. The 
EEAS security rules exemplify the nature of the EEAS as a central policy hub that 
offers a point of contact and channel for coordination and cooperation between 
national and EU actors, rather than as a purely autonomous EU agency or body. 
As mentioned above, the EEAS comprises Commission and Council officials 
as well as a meaningful presence of nationals from all member states. It aims 
to offer an environment in which national diplomatic and intelligence services 
are willing to share and exchange valuable and sensitive information. The 2011 
rules did not, however, cover ‘the protection of classified information’. It took 
two years before the High Representative, in 2013, adopted new security rules49 
repealing the 2011 rules and specifically aiming to protect classified information. 
The 2013 EEAS security rules on the protection of classified information are 
equivalent to the rules adopted by the Council and the Commission as is evident 
from Recital 5 of the 2013 decision. None of these rules makes a distinction 
between CFSP and other policy areas. 
The 2013 security rules of the Council50 also reflect the emphasis on the 
equivalence between its standards and those of the EEAS: Recital 4 states 
that the Council, the Commission and the EEAS are committed to applying 
equivalent security standards for protecting EUCI. In addition, a new provision 
was inserted into the Council’s rules – Article 12 and the corresponding 
Recital 6 – establishing a framework for the Council and stipulating the 
conditions for sharing EUCI with other Union institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies (the EEAS being one such body). Article 12(2) provides that ‘[a]ny 
47 Decision of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 15 
June 2011 on the security rules for the European External Action Service, OJ (2011) C 304/7 
(hereinafter: EEAS security rules).
48 Council Decision of 26 July 2010 establishing the organisation and functioning of the European 
External Action Service, OJ (2010) L 201/30.
49 Decision of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 19 
April 2013 on the security rules for the European External Action Service, OJ (2013) C 190/1.
50 Council Decision of 23 September 2013, note 31 supra.
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such framework shall ensure that EUCI is given protection appropriate to its 
classification level and according to basic principles and minimum standards 
which shall be equivalent to those laid down in this Decision’. 
Indeed, the 2013 EEAS security rules seem to be modelled after those of the 
Council – with exactly the same sequence and subject-matter of annexes, 
detailing the various aspects of EUCI protection. However, one notable 
difference between the Council and EEAS rules is the statement in Recital 6 
of the latter that ‘this Decision is taken without prejudice to Articles 15 and 
16 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and to 
instruments implementing them’. Thus, there seems to be a more pronounced 
concern for balancing secrecy with openness and the protection of personal data 
in the EEAS than in the Council rules which do not make any reference to those 
provisions of the Treaties. 
 
The Council’s new rules make a single reference to CFSP in the context of 
releasing EUCI and a single reference to the specific context of ‘security of 
information agreements’ with third countries.51 The first provision invests the 
Political and Security Committee (PSC) with responsibility for formulating a 
recommendation to the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper) on 
the release of CFSP/CSDP information where such a release is not recommended 
by the Security Committee. For non-CFSP information (‘all other matters’) 
the Coreper makes a decision without a recommendation by the PSC. The 
second provision allows the Council to authorise the High Representative, 
in compliance with the ORCON principle, to release to a third state or 
international organisation with whom such an agreement has been concluded, 
EUCI originating in the Council in relation to CFSP. It also states specifically 
that the High Representative may delegate such authorisation to senior EEAS 
officials or to EU Special Representatives. 
The Commission, the Council and the EEAS hence apply equivalent rules to 
EUCI, with few procedural differences in the area of CFSP and in other matters. 
The 2013 EEAS security rules make an explicit reference to the Treaty provisions 
on openness and the protection of personal data, which do not find a parallel in 
the equivalent 2013 security rules of the Council.
51 Ibid., Annex VI - exchange of classified information with third states and international 
organisations, para. 34 and para. 38.
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5 EU autonomous 
sanctions based 
on secret national 
information52
Restrictive measures, i.e. sanctions, targeting natural and legal persons, are the 
strong suit of the EU’s CFSP. At present, the EU presides over 38 sanctions 
regimes, about half of which are autonomous sanctions regimes for which the 
EU itself designates the targets.53 All but one of the EU’s autonomous sanctions 
regimes are geographically defined. One such regime targets terrorist suspects 
irrespective of their origin.54 Sanctions are central to the question of secrecy 
in the area of CFSP. On 25 February 2016, 278 cases concerning restrictive 
measures (both autonomous and UN based regimes) were closed by the EU 
Courts. Of these cases, 51 concerned a particularly controversial terrorist 
regime. Another 89 cases are pending before the EU Courts. All these cases 
raise issues of access to information, both by applicants and the judiciary.55 The 
present discussion will focus on EU autonomous sanctions regimes as, in this 
matter, the EU institutions and the Member States, in principle, possess all the 
relevant information. Secrecy is hence a choice of the EU and its Member States 
in the context of autonomous sanctions and does not depend on the decision of 
external actors such as third countries or the UN sanctions committees. 
5.1 Autonomous EU sanctions procedure
The targeted individuals under autonomous EU sanctions regimes are listed 
pursuant to a composite procedure.56 The composite listing procedure takes 
place in three phases. First, a ‘competent national authority’ takes a ‘decision’.57 
Second, the Council adopts a CFSP decision (referred to as a common position 
pre-Lisbon) listing an individual or organisation as a terrorist suspect based 
on the ‘precise information or material in the relevant file’, indicating that a 
52 This section draws on Eckes, note 28 supra, 177-198.
53 http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/measures_en.pdf (visited on 25 February 2016).
54 See for more detail on the procedural differences and similarities: C. Eckes (2014) ‘EU 
Restrictive Measures Against Natural and Legal Persons: From Counterterrorist to Third 
Country Sanctions’ 51 Common Market Law Review 869-906.
55 Ibid.
56 For counter-terrorist measures, this procedure is e.g. set out in Article 1(4) of Council Common 
Position 2001/931/CFSP of 27 December 2001 on the application of specific measures to 
combat terrorism, OJ (2001) L 344/93. The most recent list was adopted in: Council Decision 
2011/872/CFSP, OJ (2011) L 343/54. 
57 See for counter-terrorist sanctions: Article 1(4) of Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, ibid.
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decision has been taken in the national context.58 Third, the assets of those listed 
are actually frozen in a directly applicable regulation implementing the CFSP 
decision.
Lists of terrorist suspects are prepared and maintained in a permanent CP 931 
Working Party.59 After a specific name is proposed, the representatives of the 
Member States have two weeks to consult other governmental officials. Pursuant 
to its mandate, the permanent CP 931 Working Party has charge of (i) examining 
and evaluating information with a view to listing; (ii) assessing whether the 
information meets ‘the criteria in Common Position 2001/931/CFSP and in 
the Council’s statement agreed when the Common Position was adopted’; (iii) 
preparing the regular review; and (iv) making recommendations for listings and 
de-listings.60 Any listing is finally agreed in a unanimous decision of the Council, 
usually – where there are no objections – in a written procedure (A-point).
The procedure, as it is set out in Common Position 2001/931 and in the working 
methods of the CP 931 Working Party, appears to require that Member States 
share the relevant information with the Council and the permanent CP 931 
Working Party. ‘Relevant information’ refers to the facts and the national law 
that, in the view of the competent national authority, justifies a listing in the 
EU context. However, the specific level of scrutiny that the Council and its CP 
931 Working Party exercise over the listing proposed by a Member State remains 
ambiguous. Many details of the adoption procedures governing autonomous 
EU sanctions, including the precise listing requirements, remain blurry. This is 
due to several factors. First, the formulation of Common Position 2001/931 is 
vague and requires further specification. Second, national judicial systems differ 
considerably and deal very differently with terrorist suspects. Third, the CJEU 
has not had the opportunity to specify the sanctioning criteria.61
Certain clarification can be found in the EU Sanctions Guidelines, which have 
been amended several times since their adoption in 2003.62 A recent change 
relates to the involvement of the EEAS. With regard to autonomous sanctions, 
the 2012 Guidelines stipulate that the EEAS ‘should have a key role in the 
preparation and review of sanctions regimes as well as in the communication 
and outreach activities accompanying the sanctions, in close cooperation with 
Member States, relevant EU delegations and the Commission.’63 The 2012 
58 See Case T-49/07 Sofiane Fahas v Council of the European Union [2010] ECR II-05555, para. 81. 
59 Council Document 10826/07, note 45 supra, Annex II. Until the establishment of the 
permanent working party in 2007, the listings were prepared in an ad hoc forum.
60 See the Working Party’s mandate in ibid., Annex I, 4.
61 Eckes, note 53 supra.
62 The first version of the EU Sanctions Guidelines was adopted by the Council on 8 December 
2003 (doc. 15579/03); updated versions were agreed on 1 December 2005 (doc. 15114/05) and 
on 22 December 2009 (doc. 17464/09).
63 Ibid., Annex I Recommendations for working methods for EU autonomous sanctions.
26 Secrecy Inside and Outside SIEPS 2016:13
Guidelines further underline the importance of ‘regular review [of all sanctions] 
in order to assess the efficiency of the adopted restrictive measures with regard 
to the objectives stated’.64 The review is conducted by the relevant Council 
working parties and committees, on the basis of – where relevant – EU Heads 
of Mission reports.65 Heads of Missions are particularly relevant in the context 
of third country sanctions. They may, for instance, help to ensure unambiguous 
identification of the targeted persons66 and are often invited to ‘provide, where 
appropriate, their advice on proposals for restrictive measures or additional 
designations’.67 The strong involvement of the EEAS underlines the CFSP nature 
of sanctions.
5.2 Level of scrutiny
The role of the Council in freezing funds requires to be considered. According to 
the CJEU, ‘[t]he Council enjoys broad discretion with regard to the matters to be 
taken into consideration for the purpose of adopting or of maintaining in force 
a measure freezing funds.’68 This extends in particular to the question of assessing 
‘the considerations of appropriateness on which such decisions are based’.69 The 
‘competent national authority’ that takes the decision to impose sanctions, is 
in principle functioning as an authority equivalent to a judicial authority.70 In 
practice, however, the competent national authorities appear to be mostly part 
of the executive branch.71 While display of a certain level of deference could be 
justified with regard to the former, this would seem less justified with regard to 
the latter. 
The Council must first verify that a decision has been taken by a national 
authority for the adoption of the initial decision to freeze funds. After the initial 
sanctioning decision, the Council must ensure, at least every six months, that 
there are sufficient grounds for keeping the blacklisted organisation on the list.72 
Both the General Court73 and the Court of Justice74 have further ruled that there 
64 Ibid., II.A.6 (emphasis added). 
65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., II.D.22.
67 Ibid., Annex I Recommendations for working methods for EU autonomous sanctions, para. 3.
68 Case T-49/141 Fahas, note 57 supra, para. 57, referring also to Case T-228/02 People’s Mojahedin 
Organization of Iran v Council (OMPI/PMOI I) [2006] ECR II-4665, para. 159, and Case 
T-341/07 Jose Maria Sison v Council [2009] ECR II-3625, paras. 65 and 66.
69 See Case T-49/07 Sofiane Fahas, note 57 supra, para. 83.
70 Ibid.
71 E.g. for Somalia: Annex II to Council Regulation 356/2010, OJ (2010) L 105/1. See also, C. 
Eckes and J. Mendes (2011) ‘The Right to Be Heard in Composite Administrative Procedures: 
Lost in Between Protection?’ 36 European Law Review 651-670.
72 See Case T-49/07 Sofiane Fahas, note 57 supra, para. 81. See also Art. 1 (4) and (5) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001 on specific restrictive measures directed against certain persons 
and entities with a view to combating terrorism, [2001] OJ L 344/70. 
73 Eckes and Mendes, note 70 supra.
74 Case C-27/09 P France v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (OMPI/PMOI)[2011] ECR 
I-13427, para. 63.
27SIEPS 2016:13 Secrecy Inside and Outside
is a distinction between the initial listing decision and subsequent listing decisions 
as concerns the Council’s engagement with the underlying information. In the 
Sison case, the General Court also explicitly stated that ‘a decision to prosecute 
may end in the abandoning of the prosecution or in acquittal in the criminal 
proceedings. It would be unacceptable for the Council not to take account of 
such matters, which form part of the body of information having to be taken 
into account in order to assess the situation (...). To decide otherwise would be 
tantamount to giving the Council and the Member States the excessive power to 
freeze a person’s funds indefinitely, beyond review by any court and whatever the 
result of any judicial proceedings taken’75. This obiter illustrates that there is an 
obligation on the Council to monitor development of the substantive allegations 
beyond the existence of a mere prima facie case. The Council must consequently, 
following the initial decision, be in possession of certain information supporting 
that decision or of information on follow up developments. 
However, irrespective of the level of actual scrutiny that the Council exercises, it 
needs to possess the relevant information simply because, in the event of a legal 
challenge, both the General Court76 and the Court of Justice77 will require the 
Council to submit the relevant information to them. Neither court accepts the 
legality of listing decisions based on information that cannot be shared with the 
judiciary. There are a large number of judicial challenges pending and, in order 
to avoid annulment of its decisions, the Council must be in the position to 
submit the relevant information to the Courts.
5.3 Classified information
Classified information regularly plays a role in the decision to impose autonomous 
sanctions. In the appeal of France v PMOI, the PMOI was the subject of a 
subsequent listing, after a national quasi-judicial body had annulled the reason 
for the initial listing.78 Yet, the new information on which the subsequent listing 
was based was not communicated to the applicant before the listing or even at 
the time of the legal challenge. The Council informed the Court that ‘it was 
unable to produce, at that stage, certain further documents setting out the 
proposed new basis for listing PMOI and explaining the reasons for its proposal, 
since these were classified as confidential by the French Republic and could not be 
made available at the time the response was submitted’.79 
75 Case T-341/07 Jose Maria Sison, note 67 supra, para. 116. See for similar reasoning: Case 
T-348/07 Al Aqsa v Council [2010] ECR II-04575, para. 168; Case T-49/07 Sofiane Fahas, note 
57 supra, para. 81.
76 Case T-284/08 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council (OMPI/PMOI III) [2008] 
ECR II-3487, para. 71-73.
77 Case C-27/09 P France v OMPI/PMOI, note 73 supra.
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid, para. 42.
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The Council hence refused to submit documents to the Court on the grounds 
simpliciter that they were classified as confidential. It did not make an assessment 
of the need for confidentiality itself. In this regard, in the first instance, the 
General Court had made clear that ‘the Council’s contention that it [was] bound 
by the French authorities’ claim for confidentiality […] [did] not explain why 
the production of the relevant information or material in the file to the Court 
would violate the principle of confidentiality, whereas their production to the 
members of the Council, and thus to the governments of the 26 other Member 
States, [would] not.’80 This is in line with the General Court’s basic position that 
‘the Council is not entitled to base its funds-freezing decision on information or 
material in the file communicated by a Member State, if the said Member State 
is not willing to authorise its communication to the Community judicature 
whose task is to review the lawfulness of that decision’.81
5.4 Who decides what is confidential? 
The core problem with respect to the adoption procedure for imposing 
autonomous EU sanctions is the use of confidential information. This raises 
the question as to who should decide what information is to be considered 
confidential. Does the ORCON principle apply? As was explained above, the 
concept of originator control is well entrenched in the handling and sharing 
of sensitive information. This is highly relevant in the case of autonomous EU 
sanctions, given that, as we have already seen, all relevant information that leads 
to a listing in the EU context emanates from national authorities. ORCON 
also means that where the information has been classified in accordance with 
national procedures, it cannot be reclassified or declassified by the EU, unless the 
originator consents. Further, information provided by a Member State cannot be 
passed on to any other institution or body without the consent of that Member 
State. Ultimately, where it is decided that ORCON should apply, national 
control over shared information is nearly absolute. Particularly, there is no 
requirement for the designating Member State to justify on the merits its choice 
to classify, or refuse to declassify, or to consent to the release, of information, 
which it has provided to the Council. 
Neither the 2013 Council decision on EUCI, nor the 2013 EEAS security 
rules specifically mentions either the Access Regulation or court proceedings.82 
80 Case T-284/08 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council (OMPI/PMOI III), note 75 
supra, para. 72. See also AG Sharpston, Opinion in C-27/09 P France v OMPI/PMOI, note 73 
supra, para. 72: ‘As regards the Council’s contention that it is bound by the French authorities’ 
claim for confidentiality, this does not explain why the production of the relevant information 
or material in the file to the Court would violate the principle of confidentiality, whereas 
their production to the members of the Council, and thus to the governments of the 26 other 
Member States, did not.’
81 Case T-284/08 People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran v Council (OMPI/PMOI III), note 75 
supra, para. 73.
82 The 2011 Council decision, note 29 supra, on EUCI, used to explicitly state that it complies 
with existing transparency rules.
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Yet, they should be interpreted as being subject to the EU’s rules on access to 
documents, which include ORCON as an established principle. The Access 
Regulation for example sets out in Article 4(4) that the EU institutions are 
required to consult the third party from which a document originates ‘with 
a view to assessing whether an exception […] is applicable, unless it is clear 
that the document shall or shall not be disclosed.’ Article 9(3) stipulates that 
‘[s]ensitive documents shall be recorded in the register or released only with 
the consent of the originator’. Both provisions reflect the ORCON principle 
without specifically mentioning it. 
Furthermore, Article 4(5) of the Access Regulation stipulates that ‘[a] Member 
State may request the institution not to disclose a document originating from 
that Member State without its prior agreement’. National classification may be 
seen as an automatic ‘request’. However, the Court of Justice interpreted Article 
4(5) as not giving Member States ‘a general and unconditional right of veto, so 
that it can oppose, in an entirely discretionary manner and without having to 
give reasons for its decision, the disclosure of any document held by a [Union] 
institution simply because it originates from that Member State’. Such an 
interpretation, it ventured, ‘would not be compatible with the objectives […]’ of 
the Regulation.83 Hence, pursuant to the case law of the EU Courts, ORCON 
does not stand in the way of disclosure to the judiciary. The Court made clear 
that Member States could oppose disclosure only where this would be possible 
within the framework of the exceptions set out in Article 4(1) to (3) of Regulation 
1049/2001.84 This does not – at least not directly – answer the question of who 
should be in charge of taking the final decision as to whether or not a document 
can be released. However, it does place the decision firmly within the EU law 
context and does not grant a general exception for information classified under 
national law. 
The exceptions under the Access Regulation may require an assessment of the 
interests of the Member States (as distinguished from the interest of the Union). 
In particular, Article 4(1)(a) refers to ‘[…] the protection of the public interest as 
regards public security, defence and military matters [and] international relations 
[…] of a Member State’. Member States have a broad discretion in determining 
their interest within the meaning of this exception under EU law. Yet, any 
decision to conceal information based on any of the exceptions in Article 4 
necessarily falls within the jurisdiction and control of the Court of Justice. This, 
of course, necessarily implies disclosure to the Court. 
5.5 Information in judicial proceedings
In principle, Member States are under an obligation to cooperate and provide 
relevant information supporting listing under the autonomous sanctions 
83 Case C-64/05 P Sweden v Commission [2007] ECR I-11389, para. 58.
84 Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, note 17 supra.
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regimes.85 They are equally obliged to keep the Council and each other informed 
about developments in cases that are already listed by the EU. The Council 
depends on the willingness of the competent national authorities to submit their 
decisions and the relevant information. Excluding sensitive information would 
in many cases make it impossible for the Council to make an informed decision 
about the listing or to avoid annulment by the EU Courts. 
At the same time, in practice, a certain level of secrecy has to be guaranteed in 
the EU context to ensure cooperation by the Member States.86 In the context of 
sanctions, this includes, in particular, guaranteeing confidentiality of information 
shared with the EU Courts. Indeed, as the final assessment of the legality of both 
the sanctioning decision and any decision denying access to information lies 
with the EU judiciary, this necessarily requires that the court have access to the 
relevant information, including confidential information. 
At present, the General Court’s rules of procedure provide that relevant 
information must be disclosed to the other party and that the Court will consider 
only information available to both sides.87 The current rules of procedure of 
the Court of Justice address only the issue of confidential information with 
regard to interveners to the proceedings, from whom information may be 
kept in certain circumstances.88 The General Court has recently revised its 
rules of procedure,89 aiming inter alia to improve ‘the procedural treatment of 
confidential information or material pertaining to the security of the Union 
or of its Member States or to the conduct of their international relations’.90 
Triggered in particular by the procedural difficulties of dealing with confidential 
information in sanctions cases,91 such revision has introduced into the General 
Court’s rules of procedure an entirely new chapter on the specific treatment of 
85 See Article 4 Common Position 2001/931/CFSP, note 55 supra, and Article 8 Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001, note 71 supra.
86 The case of Europol demonstrates that the concern that information is officially passed 
on against the will of the providing Member State is not the only obstacle to information 
sharing but that a general lack of trust lies at the core. See: House of Lords, European Union 
Committee, note 36 supra, foreword (summarising paras. 49 et seq).
87 See Art. 67 para 3 of the Consolidated version of the Rules of Procedure of the General Court 
of 2 May 1991, OJ C 177/37.
88 Art. 131 of the Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of 29 September 2012, OJ L 265/1.
89 The draft rules of procedure of the General Court were submitted to the Council in March 
2014, see document 7795/14, COUR 12, INST 157, JUR 164 [for the revision procedure, see 
Articles 253(6) and 254(5) TFEU].
90 Ibid, see in particular the fifth objective, Chapter 6, Section 3 and Chapter 7. The draft rules 
were discussed in the meeting of the Security Committee of the Council on 23 September 2014 
(see provisional agenda, pt 7); in the Working party on the Court of Justice on 10 October 2014 
(provisional agenda, pt 2). 
91 The introduction to Chapter 7 specifically refers to restrictive measures, even if Article 105 is 
phrased in general terms and could be applied to other security matters.
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highly sensitive information.92 Under the new rules, it is for the General Court to 
decide whether the confidentially submitted information is relevant to the case 
and whether it is indeed confidential in nature. If both these criteria are fulfilled, 
the General Court will depart from the adversarial principle and communicate 
only a non-confidential version to the other party.93 If the Court considers the 
information relevant but is not convinced as to its confidential nature, the party 
that submitted the information may choose to have the information disregarded 
in the proceedings rather than have it communicated to the other party.94 Hence, 
the party that has submitted the information remains in the position to object 
to its communication to the other party even where the General Court has 
concluded that there were no overriding reasons justifying secrecy.
The General Court’s new rules of procedure do not specifically refer to classified 
information; similarly, they do not set out special rules for CFSP. Hence, they 
apply to all TFEU policies and to the CFSP. Moreover, the Court independently 
assesses whether the information should be treated as confidential, based on 
overriding considerations pertaining to the security of the Union or its Member 
States. This means that unclassified information can be considered confidential 
(and will hence not be communicated to the other party), but, more importantly, 
it means that neither classification by the Union nor by the national authorities 
will predetermine the Court’s decision.
92 Chapter 7 (Article 105) on ‘Information or materials pertaining to the security of the Union or 
of its Member States or to the conduct of their international relations’; see also new Art. 103-
104 on treatment of confidential information, items and documents produced in the context of 
measures of inquiry.
93 See for details Article 105(5) and (6) of the draft rules, note 89 supra.
94 Ibid., Art. 105(4) of the draft rules.
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6 Secrecy surrounding 
the negotiation 
of international 
agreements95
As explained above, secrecy in foreign affairs may be necessary because of the 
subject-matter triggering the secrecy, e.g. where counter-terrorist policies are 
concerned; however, such secrecy may also be justified because the law-making 
was internationalised and involved third countries, whose interests differed from 
those of the EU, and with whom the EU required a separate negotiation.
6.1  Internationalised law-making and the extended 
involvement of parliament
It has become a commonplace to state that internationalisation of rulemaking is 
withering the classic distinction between international law – regulating relations 
between international legal actors – and domestic law – regulating relations 
between public authority and individuals. International law and organisations 
regulate government-individual relations, and domestic authorities take part 
in international law-making. International agreements and the scope of action 
of international organisations have become ever more comprehensive and 
ever more determinative of the position of individuals.96 As a consequence, 
international standards determine the quality of life97 and international sector-
specific agreements regulate domestic issues right down to specific spending 
targets on public welfare.98 The growing direct or indirect impact of international 
agreements on the legal position of individuals is an important argument in favour 
of transparency. Only where citizens have access to the relevant information can 
they become politically involved and participate in shaping the decisions that 
determine their legal rights. 
95 This paragraph draws on C. Eckes (2014) ‘How the European Parliament’s Participation in 
International Relations Affects the Deep Tissue of the EU’s Power Structures’ 12 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law and Curtin, note 11 supra. 
96 On comprehensiveness consider e.g. the functional widening of the WTO agreements. On 
the direct impact on individuals, e.g. UNHCR conducts status determination for individual 
refugees, see e.g. M. Pallis, ‘The Operation of UNHCR’s Accountability Mechanisms’ IILJ 
Working Paper 2005/12; UN sanctions against individuals, see Eckes, note 40 supra. 
97 PISA Rankings in educational performance or international quality standards for 
pharmaceuticals.
98 J. Hagen-Zanker and A. McCord (2013) ‘The Affordability of Social Protection in the Light of 
International Spending Commitments’ 31 Development Policy Review 397-418. 
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Within the EU legal order, the CJEU has, by its decisions, positioned 
international agreements between primary and secondary law in the legal 
hierarchy.99 This makes a change to EU secondary legislation by international 
rulemaking perfectly possible. As most EU secondary legislation is democratically 
legitimised, not only indirectly through Member States’ representatives in the 
Council, but also directly through participation by the European Parliament 
as co-legislator, democratic legitimation would be necessarily undermined if 
the executive could change secondary legislation by concluding international 
agreements. Within the EU legal order, the European Parliament’s participation 
in the negotiation process and in the conclusion of international agreements 
is one fundamental way of democratically legitimising the content of these 
agreements, which increasingly is of a quality similar to domestic legislation, 
including potential horizontal effect. It ensures that, in principle, the public 
remains informed and involved. The Lisbon Treaty extended the involvement of 
the European Parliament at the conclusion stage of the legislative process, and 
also, in a more limited fashion, at the negotiation stage (Article 218 TFEU). 
This can be interpreted as being motivated by two objectives: firstly, to reflect 
Parliament’s increased internal powers, and, secondly, to prevent parliamentary 
exclusion in the conclusion of increasingly broad and detailed international 
agreements, which govern and regulate the legal position of individuals in the 
same way as internal legislation.100
In the specific domain of the negotiation and conclusion of international 
agreements, the Parliament now enjoys the power to veto the conclusion of 
international agreements negotiated on behalf of the EU (Articles 218(6) 
and (4) TFEU). This novel right of veto is specifically linked with a right to 
information: Article 281(10) TFEU states that the EP is to be ‘immediately and 
fully informed at all stages of the (negotiating) procedure’. In the view of the EP, 
following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, this provision implies the 
right of access to all information in the negotiations conducted by the Council 
or the Commission at all stages of the procedure: pre-negotiation, on-going 
negotiations and final outcome (and implementation). The legal framing of 
this right to information goes beyond the parameter of the merely advisory or 
consultative role the Parliament had historically exercised with regard to CFSP.101 
In the context of the negotiation of international agreements by the EU, it can 
be seen that, in light of the legal rights of the EP to effective information and 
participation at all stages of the negotiations process, it now plays a pivotal role 
in implementing international agreements in the EU legal order. The claim by 
the Parliament that it has the right to receive – albeit in a regulated way – both 
99 Case C-181/73, Haegeman v Belgium [1974] ECR 449; see also Article 216(2) TFEU.
100 For the second point see: T. Tiilikainen (2011) ‘The Empowered European Parliament: 
Accommodation to the New Functions Provided by the Lisbon Treaty’ 91 Finish Institute of 
International Affairs, Briefing Paper.
101 See, D. Thym (2006) ‘Beyond Parliament’s Reach? The Role of the European Parliament in the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy’ 11 European Foreign Affairs Review 109-127.
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classified and unclassified information, irrespective of the originator of the 
EUCI or the principle of originator control, is on the whole actively resisted by 
the executive institutions, in particular the Council and the Commission (pre-
negotiations and during the international negotiations) and Europol (in terms of 
implementation). In the view of the Commission and the Council, international 
agreements are agreements between two contracting parties (the EU and a 
third state or international organisation) with no direct effects on citizens and 
limited parliamentary involvement by most states.102 Recent practice however 
reveals some of the highly political issues that the EU has negotiated with third 
states, which have a type of legislative impact on citizens’ rights or interests in a 
substantive sense. In view of these developments, legal and institutional practices 
are emerging that illustrate the need for a review of the prevailing diplomatic 
paradigm that limits the input of member states to these types of negotiations. 
6.2  Inter-institutional access by the European Parliament to 
sensitive documents during negotiations
The European Parliament’s strengthened position in the negotiation process 
and in the conclusion of international agreements should not overshadow the 
reality that, in the EU, as in the Member States,103 the executive has a privileged 
position in conducting external relations. This has been explicitly acknowledged 
by the CJEU.104 Despite the strengthened role of Parliament, the Council takes 
central stage and remains a stronghold of national executives working behind 
closed doors – albeit, in many cases to reach interstate compromise, rather 
than to identify the common EU interest. The Council’s strong position is 
visible in Article 218 TFEU, pursuant to which the Commission submits 
recommendations to the Council, which then authorises the opening of 
negotiations, adopts negotiating directives, authorises the signing of agreements 
and concludes them. The Council also nominates the Union negotiator or the 
head of the Union’s negotiating team. While the Commission usually acts as 
negotiator for the Union, in the area of CFSP this role may be entrusted to the 
High Representative, who is equally mandated by the Council. Even though 
the Commission is representing the common interest and its independence of 
the Member States is formally ensured,105 in the context of the negotiation of 
international agreements, it is bound by a negotiating mandate and is further 
exercising powers delegated to it by the Council. The Council’s control over 
102 D. Thym, ‘Parliamentary Involvement in European International Relations’ in M. Cremona and 
B. de Witte (eds.), EU Foreign Relations Law: Constitutional Fundamentals (Hart Publishing, 
2008) 201-224.
103 E.g. Germany: GFCC, BVerfGE 68,1 (87) Atomwaffenstationierung. The German 
Constitutional Court explicated one important rationale for the executive’s dominance in 
foreign affairs. Different from Parliament, it possesses the ‘appropriate personnel, material and 
organizational potential’. See also, G. Biehler, Auswärtige Gewalt (Mohr Siebeck, 2005) 3-55.
104 E.g.: Case T-529/09 in ’t Veld v Council, note 24 supra, para. 88; see also para. 57, and the end 
of para. 59 of the judgment.
105 Article 17(3) TEU: Commissioners should be chosen from ‘from persons whose independence is 
beyond doubt’ and ‘the Commission shall be completely independent’.
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the Commission in the negotiation of agreements that fall under the Common 
Commercial Policy exemplifies this. Article 207(3) TFEU sets out that ’[t]he 
Commission shall conduct [the] negotiations in consultation with a special 
committee appointed by the Council to assist the Commission in this task and 
within the framework of such directives as the Council may issue to it. The 
Commission shall report regularly to the special committee and to the European 
Parliament on the progress of negotiations.’
The European Parliament has in recent years been able to enflesh the Treaty bones 
in terms of accountability by engaging in a whole host of inter-institutional 
arrangements with both the Council and the Commission.106 Many of these 
informal inter-institutional arrangements concern the provision of information 
in one form or another to the European Parliament. The European Parliament 
has successfully negotiated a series of inter-institutional agreements with 
various actors facilitating the provision by such actors of information – both 
classified and unclassified – to the European Parliament. Since 2002, it has put 
arrangements in place to ‘receive’ and ‘handle’ sensitive information that relate 
to policy areas such as CFSP, internal security and foreign and security policy.107 
This inter-institutional trajectory, granting ‘privileged’ and ‘closed’ access to 
certain MEPs under precise conditions, has culminated in the recent negotiation 
of a number of new inter-institutional agreements with various actors (the 
Council and the EEAS in particular) facilitated by decisions of the Parliament 
to modify and expand its own internal security rules108 in order to reflect changes 
to the Council’s security rules. A notable aspect of the new rules is the addition 
of a lengthy Annex II, which, much like the Annexes of the Council’s security 
rules, provides extensive details on the various aspects of ‘secure treatment and 
management of confidential information by the European Parliament’. The term 
‘confidential information’ includes but is not limited to classified information 
and also covers ‘non-classified other confidential information’ (abbreviated in 
this paper as CUI).109 
In September 2012, the Council and the Parliament concluded an inter-
institutional agreement that covers all international agreements that do not 
106 See further, D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union: Law, Practice and the Living 
Constitution (Oxford University Press, 2009).
107 This is in line with the fact that Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 (note 17 supra) in Article 
9 explicitly foresees the adoption of implementing inter-institutional rules on how ‘sensitive 
documents’ will be transmitted to the European Parliament in a manner that will not involve 
their being made ‘public’ but will respect the confidential classification status. See G. Rosén, 
‘‘Can You Keep a Secret?’ How the European Parliament Got Access to Sensitive Documents in 
the Area of Security and Defence’, RECON Online Working Paper 2011/22.
108 Decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament of 6 June 2011 concerning the rules 
governing the treatment of confidential information by the European Parliament, OJ (2011) 
C 190/2. Decision of the Bureau of the European Parliament of 15 April 2013 concerning 
the rules governing the treatment of confidential information by the European Parliament, OJ 
(2014) C 96/1. 
109 Ibid., Article 2(b). 
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exclusively deal with CFSP matters.110 Article 1 (purpose and scope) sets out 
that the agreement governs ‘the forwarding to and handling by the EP of 
classified information held by the Council …which is relevant in order for the 
EP to exercise its powers and functions.’ It covers amongst others international 
agreements on which the EP is to be consulted or is required to give its consent 
pursuant to Article 218(6) TFEU, including the negotiating directives for these 
agreements. 
This covers information generated by the EU institutions themselves. An 
additional problem remains the above-discussed originator control principle 
(ORCON). Such principle becomes particularly relevant in a negotiation 
context, where input to international law-making originates outside of the EU.111 
More recently, the inter-institutional agreement still under negotiation between 
the Parliament, the Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy concerns access by the EP to classified information 
held by the Council and the EEAS in the area of foreign and security policy. 112
6.3 Parliamentary access to documents behind closed doors
The greatest continuing concern following the extension of Parliament’s powers 
remains the lack of open debate. While it may be able to exercise some control over 
the final outcome, the EP’s function of informing the public and contributing 
to shaping the public debate will remain limited by the procedural arrangements 
governing how information is shared with Parliament. Even where access is 
granted, it extends only to a few MEPs and in very restrictive circumstances. 
This is very problematic in the context of the European Parliament’s core role as 
a window to the public. It divides MEPs into ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ and gives the former 
a sense of inclusion and power. The problems are comparable to agreements 
hammered out behind closed doors that are then passed at first reading within 
the ordinary legislative procedure.113 This practice has been severely criticised for 
110 Agreement concerning the forwarding to and handling by the European Parliament of classified 
information held by the Council on matters other than those in the area of the common foreign 
and security policy, of 13 September 2012, P7 TA(2012)0339. The agreement was finalised on 
12 March 2014, see OJ (2014) C 95/1, and entered into force on 1 April 2014. 
111 The agreement between Council and Parliament confirms ORCON as the basic principle of 
handling classified information. Article 3(4): ‘the Council may grant the European Parliament 
access to classified information which originates in other Union institutions, bodies, offices or 
agencies, or in Member States, third States or international organisations only with the prior 
written consent of the originator.’
112 General Secretariat of the Council, Document 15343/12, LIMITED (Listed in the Council’s 
register of documents as ‘not accessible’, last checked on 7 February 2016). However, the 
document is available through StateWatch <http://www.statewatch.org/news/2012/oct/eu-
council-ep-access-class-info-15343-12.pdf> (last visited 7 February 2016).
113 See for more details: Guide to the ordinary legislative procedure, October 2010, available at: 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/QC3109179ENC.pdf (last visited 4 November 
2014). 
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lack of openness.114 It certainly prevents an open public debate on issues that are 
usually subject to such a debate.
It is still early days and too soon to know exactly how the EP is applying these 
rules in practice and clearly the Council is adopting an attitude of ‘wait and see’ 
(also by building in provisional and far-reaching rules even for the category of 
‘RESTRICTED’ documents115). It is not uncommon in national democracies 
to limit access to particularly sensitive classified information to a limited – or, 
indeed, very limited – number of security-cleared parliamentarians. However, 
it is also not uncommon in national democracies to allow such access to full 
committees in relevant subject areas (intelligence or security and defence and 
foreign policy). 
One of the problems that has already emerged in practice relates to where access 
is very restricted; in such circumstances, the value of the consultation may be 
very limited as the information cannot be shared with the full committee or 
otherwise. It creates different classes of legislators – those with and those without 
security clearances – and such classification does not necessarily serve the public 
interest. Moreover, if the security cleared MEPs have no access to their staff, then 
they may be substantively limited in appreciating what they are being allowed to 
read and how it must be understood in a broader context. 
6.4 Judging EU secrets116
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the secrecy surrounding the 
negotiation of international agreements has been challenged before the EU 
Courts in three prominent cases. The first two cases were brought under the 
Access Regulation. In the third, the Parliament defended its new prerogatives to 
be informed, granted under Article 218(10) TFEU. The first case concerned the 
TFTP Agreement, which is a bilateral agreement between the EU and the US 
allowing the latter to have access to financial messaging data stored by SWIFT, 
a private company based in the EU, and to be processed by the US Terrorist 
Financing Tracking program (TFTP). The second case concerned the Anti-
Counterfeiting Agreement (ACTA), which, in fact, was not actually concluded 
by the EU and never, therefore, entered into force. The subject-matter of the 
 
114 See e.g. recently and with many references: S. Carrera, N. Hernanz and J. Parkin (2013) ‘The 
‘Lisbonisation’ of the European Parliament: Assessing Progress, Shortcomings and Challenges 
for Democratic Accountability in the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice’ CEPS Paper in 
Liberty and Security in Europe No. 58 24-31.
115 Art. 6(2) of the Inter-institutional agreement between the European Parliament and the 
Council concerning the forwarding to and handling by the European Parliament of classified 
information held by the Council on matters other than those in the area of the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy OJ (2014) C 95/1.
116 This sub-paragraph draws on Curtin, note 11, 12 or 14 supra; C. Eckes (2016), Common 
Foreign and Security Policy: the Consequences of the Court’s Extended Jurisdiction, European 
Law Journal, forthcoming, and Eckes, note 94 supra.
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third case was an agreement between the EU and Mauritius concerning EU 
military operations against pirates in the Indian Ocean.
Prior to Council authorisation to open negotiations with the US in relation to 
the TFTP Agreement, a Council Legal Service opinion on the competence of 
the EU to negotiate such an agreement and on the legal basis for the agreement 
was distributed within the Council and to the Member States. The legal service 
opinion was classified as RESTRICTED, which is the lowest level in the 
Council’s security classifications, and falls outside the scope of Article 9 of the 
Access Regulation on ‘sensitive’ (classified) documents. No security clearance is 
needed to view restricted documents. This categorisation is used for ‘information 
and material the unauthorised disclosure of which could be disadvantageous to 
the interests of the Union or of one or more of the Member States’. Sophie In ‘t 
Veld, an MEP and also Vice-Chairperson of the Committee on Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs, did not gain access to this document via the privileged 
access rules that applied at that time to the relations between the Council and 
the EP. She used, rather, as a member of the public, the formal procedural route 
offered by the Access Regulation but was nonetheless also refused access in that 
context.
The Council refused access to the legal service opinion on the basis of Article 4(1)
(a) and the second indent of Article 4(2) of the Access Regulation. Its rationale 
for maintaining secrecy was overtly process-based. The Council reasoned that 
‘disclosure of [document 11897/09] would reveal to the public information 
relating to certain provisions in the envisaged Agreement…and, consequently, 
would negatively impact on the [European Union]’s negotiating position and 
would also damage the climate of confidence in the on-going negotiations’. 
117 According to the applicant, the exception relating to the protection of the 
public interest in the field of international relations in Article 4(1)(a) of the 
Access Regulation was not applicable because the legal basis for the negotiations 
‘[was] an issue of internal EU law which [was] not likely to have an impact on 
the substance of negotiations and, hence, on the international relations of the 
European Union.’ 118 
The judgment of the General Court in In ‘t Veld I is instructive with regard 
to the pre-negotiation stage in particular. It considered that the document was 
specifically drawn up for the opening of negotiations and that the analysis it 
contained was therefore linked to the envisaged international agreement. It 
thus fell within the scope of the exception relating to international relations if 
it could be shown that this public interest would be actually undermined. The 
Court held that this could be shown insofar that disclosure of some elements 
of the document would reveal part of the strategic objectives pursued by the 
117 Case T-529/09, Sophie in ‘t Veld v Council, note 24 supra, para 6.
118 Ibid., para 27.
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EU. The Court accepted that ‘disclosure of those elements would damage the 
climate of confidence in the negotiations which were on-going at the time the 
contested decision was adopted.’119 The Court thus drew a very important line 
regarding what could and could not be revealed in the context of international 
negotiations. It did not accept that disclosure of the analysis of the negotiations’ 
legal basis would weaken the Council’s negotiating position as such. The Council 
had argued it would do so, because the controversy could give rise to confusion 
regarding its competence and thus weaken its negotiating position. The Court 
held that non-disclosure for this reason could not be justified. It seemed to imply 
that the (hypothetical and not proven) weakening of the Council’s negotiating 
position in advance of negotiations would not justify secrecy whereas proven 
damage to the negotiating strategy of the Council as a whole during ongoing 
negotiations would justify secrecy.
More generally, in the view of the Court, the Council had failed to balance 
the protected interest against the public interest in disclosure. The fact that the 
envisaged agreement affected the fundamental right of protection of personal 
data constituted a clear public interest that had to be taken into account by the 
Council. There was thus an overriding public interest in disclosure, because ‘it 
would contribute to conferring greater legitimacy on the institutions and would 
increase EU citizens’ confidence in those institutions’. The Court held that the 
Council had failed to adequately take into account the subject-matter affected 
by the envisaged agreement. For these reasons the General Court ruled that the 
document should be disclosed, except for those parts that related to the strategic 
objectives pursued by the EU. This is one of the few cases where the Court 
actually ruled on the public interest and came out in favour of it, rather than 
choosing to find procedural faults.120
The Court also ruled much more generally that the principle of transparency 
applies to the international relations of the EU and it took particular account 
of the subject-matter affected by the agreement and of its effects on individuals. 
The rulings constituted in any event an important statement of principle that 
potentially has wider ramifications than with regard only to the negotiation stage 
of international negotiations.
In the subsequent case involving the ACTA negotiations (In ‘t Veld II), it was the 
later stages of the negotiation process that were at stake. In this context, there was 
a specific (pre-negotiation) ‘confidentiality agreement’ between the negotiating 
parties, providing that documents exchanged between the Parties would not be 
made public unless the Parties agreed. The underlying rationale of the agreement 
– embedded in a historical understanding of the diplomatic relationship among 
119 Ibid., paras. 33-36 and paras. 57-59.
120 See, for example, the approach adopted by the CJEU in Case C-28/08 P, European Commission v 
Bavarian Lager [2010] ECR I-06055.
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the negotiating parties – was, again, a process-based one, seeking to prioritise 
the ‘blacking out’ of a negotiating environment in which the parties could hold 
open, frank and candid discussions. Both the Council and the Commission 
emphasised in this case the need to keep ongoing international ‘negotiations’ 
secret for reasons of effective decision-making. Instead of being considered as 
a type of quasi-negotiator present at the ‘green table’ while negotiations were 
ongoing, as seemingly envisaged by Article 218(10) TFEU, the EP was actually 
denied access to a range of key documents. In particular, the negotiation mandate 
of ACTA was not provided to the EP and Court proceedings were again brought 
by MEP Sophie In ‘t Veld to challenge the Council’s refusal. 
The classification level of negotiation – similar to that of the Council Legal 
Service opinion in the earlier TFTP case mandates – is, in principle, ‘restricted’, 
at any rate while negotiations are on-going. If one looks at the actual content 
of the ACTA negotiating mandate in question, there is nothing in it mandating 
secrecy ‘in the interests of the Union’ but rather it contains an enumeration of 
the types of issues that must be taken into account (eg data protection etc.).121 
It seems difficult to argue that such provisions constitute in any real sense 
negotiating ‘strategy’ that should be kept tactically hidden from the negotiating 
partner. It was subsequently – after the case was brought and after the EP had 
vetoed adoption of the agreement – declassified by the Commission on 12 July 
2012 and is now fully in the public domain.122 
The judgment by the General Court in In ‘t Veld II123 offers a more generous 
reading of the international relations exception than the earlier case and accepts 
that the reason for refusal to disclose information under the international 
relations exception is the fact that third countries are involved in the law-making 
process.124 This establishes a general difference in transparency between internal 
and external law-making. The level of transparency is hence dictated at least by 
the fact that law-making is taken to the outside. Where international agreements 
of a legislative nature are concluded, this is particularly concerning.125 The 
Council’s appeal in this case to the CJEU largely turned on the question of 
whether ‘negotiation and conclusion of an international agreement’ could be 
compared ‘with the institutions’ legislative activities for the purposes of applying 
121 While the case was still pending, judgment by the General Court unauthorised public disclosure 
(leaks) permitted some analysis of the nature of the information being denied: http://register.
consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st07/st07095-re01.en08.pdf (last visited 4 November 2014).
122 Ibid.
123 Case T-301/10, Sophie in ‘t Veld v Commission, ECLI:EU:T:2013:135.
124 See in particular: Ibid., paras. 115-118, 126, 206. 
125 See for ACTA: C. Eckes, E. Fahey and M. Kanetake (2013) ‘International, European and US 
Perspectives on the Negotiation and Adoption of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA)’ Currents, International Trade Law Journal.
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the overriding public interest test’.126 The Court considered that the General 
Court had erred by comparing the two. Advocate-General Sharpston addressed 
this issue at some length, concluding that ‘whether an institution is acting in a 
legislative, executive or administrative capacity should not be determinative’127 
but that ‘the institution concerned should conduct the assessment required by the 
Regulation carefully and objectively and should provide the necessary detailed 
and specific reasoning in its decision’.128 She expressed in particular concerns that 
‘all institutional activities are not necessarily amenable to such neat and precise 
classification between the legislative and other realms,’ which ‘makes it difficult 
to justify applying a different standard of review to institutional acts based on 
how the institution’s activity should be classified in a particular instance’.129 
She concluded that it was ‘over-simplistic to say, for example, that legislative 
acts generically require a high level of transparency but that other institutional 
activities generically require less transparency’.130 Acknowledging the particularity 
of international negotiations, she concluded that they should not automatically 
require less transparency, ‘even where the subject matter […] is considered to 
be sensitive.’131 The CJEU did not further elaborate on the link between the 
legislative nature of an activity and the required standard of transparency. It 
pointed out merely that the transparency rules were ‘of particular relevance 
where the Council [was] acting in its legislative capacity’, but also that non-
legislative activity equally fell under the transparency regulation.132 In the final 
analysis, the CJEU upheld the General Court’s decision in In ‘t Veld I and ruled 
that the General Court ‘confined itself to verifying the statement of reasons’ and 
‘did not infringe the Council’s discretion’.133
In the third case concerning the piracy agreement with Mauritius, the Court 
had the occasion to address the interpretation of Article 218(10) TFEU, which 
states that the EP ‘shall be immediately and fully informed at all stages of 
the procedure’.134 The EP firstly challenged the Council’s classification of the 
agreement as relating exclusively to the CFSP and secondly argued that the 
Council had breached its duty under Article 218(10) TFEU by informing 
Parliament following a three months delay. The Court considered the Council’s 
classification of the agreement as falling under the CFSP as correct. It refused 
to make a distinction, based on the wording of Article 218(3) and (6) TFEU, 
between agreements which relate ‘exclusively’ to the CFSP and those which relate 
126 Case C-350/12 P, Appeal brought on 24 July 2012 by Council of the European Union against 
the judgment of the General Court (Fifth Chamber) delivered on 4 May 2012 in Case T-529/09 
Sophie in ‘t Veld v Council, note 24 supra.
127 Ibid., para 98.
128 Ibid.
129 AG Sharpston, opinion in Case C-350/12 P, Council v In ‘t Veld, note 23 supra, para. 73.
130 Ibid., para 97.
131 Ibid.
132 Case C-350/12 P, Council v In ‘t Veld, note 23, paras. 105-7.
133 Ibid, paras. 66-68.
134 Case C-658/11, European Parliament v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025.
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‘principally’ to the CFSP,135 emphasising the ‘symmetry’ or parallelism between 
internal and external procedures.136 The Court then asserted its own jurisdiction 
over procedural issues relating to CFSP agreements, explaining that Article 19 
TEU gave it ‘general jurisdiction’ over both European Treaties and that the 
explicit limitation of its jurisdiction over CFSP matter was a derogation from 
this rule that ‘must […] be interpreted narrowly’.137 It further emphasised that 
informing Parliament was an ‘essential procedural requirement’ and cuts across 
all different procedures.138 It further held that the EP’s right to be informed ‘[was] 
the reflection, at EU level, of the fundamental democratic principle that the 
people should participate in the exercise of power through the intermediary of 
a representative assembly’.139 The Court consequently emphasised the universal 
nature of ‘the fundamental democratic principle’ and explained its interpretation 
in the EU context.
The Council’s insistence that public awareness of internal, i.e. inter-institutional, 
disputes could negatively influence international negotiations and its emphasis 
on the discretion of the executive to decide whether access to information could 
harm international relations was not unreasonable. Yet, the debate illustrates 
that transparency requirements and judicial safeguards that a democratic society 
offers with regard to the internal law-making process cannot be taken for 
granted when such law-making is moved outside of the domestic framework. 
Furthermore, when access to information is granted it is – as discussed above – 
very limited and does not allow the European Parliament to exercise its function 
as a window to the public. What has been established by the Court is that the 
fact that information relates to international relations in itself cannot justify 
secrecy (denial of access to information) and that it will exercise jurisdiction over 
the negotiation and conclusion processes of international agreements, including 
CFSP agreements. The CJEU further stressed the relevance of transparency for 
legislative activities but did not explicitly extend this to international agreements 
of a legislative nature.
135 Ibid., paras. 46 et seq.
136 Ibid, para. 56.
137 Ibid, para. 70.
138 Ibid, para. 54 and in particular paras. 80-86.
139 Ibid, para. 81, referring also to: Case 138/79, Roquette Frères v Council [1980] ECR 3333, para. 
33; and C-130/10, Parliament v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2012:472, para. 81.
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7 Conclusion
Secrecy impedes processes that are commonly regarded as essential in a democracy, 
namely the possibility of citizens and their representatives holding politicians 
and government officials accountable for their actions, and the possibility of 
having a public debate on government policy. In order to exercise democratic 
accountability, citizens must be able to attribute responsibility to politicians and 
officials. This requires openness; it needs at the very least to be clear as to which 
decisions can be attributed to which politicians, both national and European. At 
the same time, certain democratic policies require secrecy in order to be effective 
at all.140 Where executive officials are given largely unchecked power to conceal 
from the public and from parliament(s) whatever information they consider 
sensitive, part of the essential machinery of democracy is disconnected. In the 
EU political and constitutional system, there is virtually no substantive internal 
control over overclassification (either by original or derivative classifiers). It 
can be considered extraordinary that there is virtually no internal system of 
control or oversight within the executive as a whole. On the one hand, this 
can be explained by the different competences of the different institutions and 
the incremental way in which new and existing agencies are tasked and also 
by crisis scenarios and by the purely internal focus (even when de facto general 
rules are being adopted). On the other hand, it is also a consequence of the 
failure to engage with the subject in a more overtly holistic fashion (substantive 
relationship with the Access Regulation and the (new) Treaty provisions). 
Secrecy becomes a danger when it undermines the very values invoked to protect 
it: democratic self-government and security. This becomes particularly apparent 
in the area of external relations. Convincing reasons may justify a certain level of 
secrecy in external relations; yet its limits need to be patrolled in order to avoid 
the erosion of democratic values.
Technical EU security classification rules receive little attention from ‘outsiders’ 
and are adopted and amended in iterative processes as low-level internal rule-
making. Oversight mechanisms in the EU, in particular those operated by 
national parliaments, can supply some countervailing pressure but surveilling 
secrecy remains a recurrent challenge. 
The courts appear to be a major safeguard against ‘overreach’, which, of course, 
is effective only where a case is actually brought. Only in these circumstances 
will the balance between secrecy provisions and constitutional provisions on 
openness and democracy be brought into play. It remains to be seen how the 
courts (and in particular the CJEU on appeal) will attempt to balance the original 
140 D. F. Thompson (1999) ‘Democratic Secrecy’ 114 Political Science Quarterly 181-193, at 182.
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provisions of the Treaty, as amended by Lisbon, with the ongoing practices (and 
perhaps diplomatic habits) of the institutions across a range of policy areas. It is 
clear that courts in such circumstances do more than simply interpret the law; 
they fill gaps, clarify ambiguities and decide which of the parties should win.141 
The rulings of the courts, therefore, have important implications, not only for 
the individual litigants, but also for the structure and organisation of the EU 
institutions themselves. In conclusion, it is clear that the EU executive is not 
entirely ‘unbound’ in the area of external relations; however, clarity is required 
in relation to nature of the existing controls and on how effective they are in 
constraining unconstitutional conduct. 
141 J. Heliskoski and P. Leino (2006) ‘Darkness at the Break of Noon: the Case Law on Regulation 
1049/2001 on Access to Documents’ 43 Common Market Law Review 735-781.
45SIEPS 2016:13 Secrecy Inside and Outside
Svensk sammanfattning
Utrikespolitik har alltid, i viss utsträckning, förts i det dolda. Detta gäller på 
såväl nationell som EU-nivå. Utöver den sekretess som motiveras av det specifika 
ämnesområdet, som exempelvis säkerhet, finns det ytterligare logiska argument 
för sekretess inom utrikespolitiken. Involverandet av externa aktörer som driver 
sina egna intressen gör det exempelvis nödvändigt att vidhålla sekretess vad gäller 
förhandlingsstrategier, interna avtal och potentiella sekundära motiv.
Särskilt inom ramen för den nationella utrikespolitiken och EU:s utrikespolitik 
har myndigheterna stor handlingsfrihet när det gäller hur de hanterar kraven på 
sekretess visavi öppenhet, något som är uppenbart inte bara för externa aktörer 
utan även för allmänheten. Sekretess inom utrikespolitiken står därför i stark 
kontrast till EU:s grundläggande öppenhetsprincip.
Det är inte bara en fråga om att ”varje medborgare” ska ha ”rätt att delta i 
unionens demokratiska liv”, dessutom ska ”besluten (…) fattas så öppet och 
nära medborgarna som möjligt” (Artikel 10(3) EUF). Än viktigare är att 
förordning (EC) No 1049/2001 fastställer ett juridiskt bindande instrument 
beträffande tillträdesrätten till alla EU handlingar, inklusive de som handlar om 
den gemensamma utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiken. 
För att hantera behovet av sekretess gällande utrikespolitiken inom ramen 
för EU:s s.k. tillträdesförordning måste EU och dess myndigheter inom 
det utrikes- och säkerhetspolitiska området – som exempelvis Europeiska 
utrikestjänsten (Europeiska avdelningen för yttre åtgärder), Frontex (Europeiska 
byrån för förvaltningen av det operativa samarbetet vid Europeiska unionens 
medlemsstaters yttre gränser) och Europol (Europeiska polisbyrån) – väga de 
övergripande kraven på insyn mot myndigheternas behov av sekretess inom vissa 
områden, i synnerhet vad gäller den nationella säkerheten och internationella 
relationer. När det gäller EU:s yttre relationer har det därför utvecklats flera 
instrument som har till uppgift att sekretessbelägga och därmed begränsa 
allmänhetens tillgång till information.
Tonvikten i den här rapporten ligger på hur man hanterar tillgång till information 
som har sekretessbelagts av EU:s institutioner eller organ. Rapporten riktar in 
sig på tre aktuella och illustrativa exempel som visar hur EU:s inställning till 
sekretessbelagd information skapar slutna kretsar av officiella hemligheter inom 
EU:s utrikespolitik. De tre exemplen rör (1) sekretess som den tar sig uttryck i de 
regler som styr den Europeiska utrikestjänstens sammansättning, (2) godkännande 
av EU:s beslutade sanktioner riktade mot ”svartlistade” individer grundade 
på av medlemsstaterna sekretessbelagd information samt (3) sekretess kring 
internationella avtalsförhandlingar gällande olika (säkerhetsrelaterade) sakfrågor.
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Inom Europeiska utrikestjänsten (EEAS) strävar man efter att möjliggöra ett 
utbyte av värdefull och känslig information mellan dess personal samtidigt 
som man skyddar dess diplomat- och underrättelsetjänster. Trots detta 
utvecklade man år 2013 säkerhetsregler som var närmast identiska med rådets 
och kommissionens regler vad gäller just sekretessbeläggning och tillgång till 
handlingar.
Till skillnad från Europeiska utrikestjänsten begränsas vare sig EU som sådant 
eller medlemsstaterna av externa aktörer, men man väljer ändå att hemlighålla 
den information som EU:s sanktioner grundar sig på. Förfarandet kräver ett 
ömsesidigt utbyte av ”relevant information” mellan såväl behöriga inhemska 
myndigheter och rådet som den permanenta arbetsgruppen CP 931 som ansvarar 
för att utarbeta listan över terrormisstänkta. Dessvärre är många detaljer kring 
godkännandeförfarandet av EU:s sanktioner av flera skäl fortfarande otydliga. 
Det handlar bland annat om det betydande handlingsutrymme rådet har när 
det gäller hur man övervakar förfarandet, användandet av hemligstämplad och 
konfidentiell information som grund för svartlistning och svårigheterna kring 
hur man använder sekretessbelagd information i rättsliga förfaranden vid EU:s 
domstolar.142
Internationella avtal skapar ytterligare en utmaning, eftersom deras antagande 
i ökad utsträckning beror på godkännande – eller åtminstone inte veto – av 
Europaparlamentet. Det som ett resultat av artikel 281 (10) i Fördraget 
om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt (TFEU), där man konstaterar att 
Europaparlamentet ska ”omedelbart och fullständigt informeras i alla skeden 
av förfarandet”. Denna inkluderar parlamentets rätt att få tillgång till känsliga 
eller till och med hemliga handlingar. Denna parlamentets exklusiva tillgång 
till handlingar har vid upprepade tillfällen blivit ett ärende för EU:s domstolar. 
Bland annat tack vare den nederländska EP-ledamoten Sophie In’t Veld, vars fall 
även baserades på de rättigheter som följer av EU:s tillträdesförordning.
Domstolsprövning är alltjämt den mest effektiva mekanismen för att begränsa 
sekretessen inom EU:s utrikespolitik. Det kräver dock att ett ärende verkligen 
tas till domstol. Bara då kommer frågan om balans mellan sekretessregler och 
författningsbestämmelser om öppenhet och demokrati att kunna prövas. Det 
återstår att se hur domstolarna (i synnerhet EU-domstolen, efter överklagande) 
kommer att försöka balansera de ursprungliga bestämmelserna i fördraget, som 
de kommer till uttryck i Lissabonfördraget, och EU-institutionernas praxis (eller 
kanske diplomatiska vanor) inom olika politikområden. Det är uppenbart att 
domstolarna, när de granskar huruvida sekundärlagstiftningen är förenlig med 
fördraget, gör mer än bara tolkar lagen: de kompletterar, förtydligar och avgör 
142 Med EU:s domstolar avses här Europeiska unionens domstol och tribunalen.
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vem av parterna som har rätt.143 Domstolarnas utslag får betydande konsekvenser, 
inte bara för inblandade parter utan också för EU-institutionernas struktur och 
organisation. Sammanfattningsvis ter det sig uppenbart att den verkställande 
makten i EU inte är helt ”fri” vad gäller externa relationer. Ökad klarhet krävs 
dock när det gäller de befintliga kontrollerna och hur effektiva de är i att begränsa 
författningsstridigt agerande.
143 J. Heliskoski and P. Leino (2006) ‘Darkness at the Break of Noon: The Case Law on Regulation 
1049/2001 on Access to Documents’ 43 Common Market Law Review 735-781.
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